In this paper we analyze the equilibrium market structure, following liberalization, of an industry involving an essential facility. Two alternative modes of market entry are considered, in conjunction with vertical integration, namely: (i) full entry, which means building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost; and (ii) partial entry, which means purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent, at a fixed price per unit that is freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant. We show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, and that upstream firms choose to share the incumbent's facility when the entrant's fixed cost exceeds a positive threshold. In addition, welfare analysis shows that in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between fixed-cost savings and softened downstream competition, thus providing a rationale for the liberalization of such industries. Several competition policy implications are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L4, O34.
I INTRODUCTION
OVER THE LAST FEW DECADES there has been a global trend towards market liberalization and the introduction of competition among services that were previously provided by monopolists; examples include electricity, railways, telecommunications, water, oil and gas supply, airports and ports, all of which are now open to competition. Such markets are characterized by the presence of vertical integration and essential facilities (i.e. a facility that is essential for downstream production). Nowadays it is common to see port operators integrated with shipping companies, oil transportation and electricity companies integrated with distribution companies, and hospitals and/or health plans operating in partnership with medical clinics and physicians. 1 In this paper we examine the problem of entering the essential-facility market, in conjunction with vertical integration and foreclosure. We consider a situation in which there are initially two independent downstream firms competing a-là-Cournot, and an nonintegrated monopoly upstream that owns an essential facility of unlimited capacity. The industry is then liberalized, so upstream Cournot competition and vertical integration are now allowed; and there is a potential upstream entrant facing two possible entry modes: (i) full entry, by building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost (hereinafter referred to as facility-based competition); or (ii) partial entry, by purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent at a fixed price per unit, freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant (hereinafter referred to as facility sharing).
2 This paper studies the equilibrium market structure and welfare implications, following liberalization, of two alternative modes of market entry in conjunction with vertical integration.
The post-liberalization equilibrium market structure is as follows. Facility-based competition and full vertical integration occurs when the fixed cost is below a positive 1 In many countries vertical integration is increasingly the rule rather than the exception in service sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, natural gas, water and sewerage. See Newbery (1999) for a review of this topic. 2 We do not allow for general nonlinear pricing. As suggested by one referee, a justification for linear pricing is the imposition of nondiscriminatory open access. In that sense, the model considered here can be thought of as one in which the only regulation is nondiscriminatory open access. Nonetheless, most results are robust to two-part tariffs. December 2006 No.4 threshold, whereas facility sharing and full vertical integration occurs otherwise. Vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, since it avoids double marginalization and counters the integrated firm's incentive to foreclose by buying input from the nonintegrated upstream firm and hence easing downstream competition.
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3 Facility-based competition occurs when the fixed cost is below a given threshold, since the incumbent's gain from preventing competition by stopping the entrant from building its own facility is outweighed by the loss from selling capacity at a price below marginal cost.
If the fixed cost is large enough, however, the essential facility is shared since the per-unit price of capacity rises with the fixed cost, yet it never reaches the monopoly price. This result stems from the fact that the entrant trades off the benefit of building its own facility and having a low marginal cost, with that of sharing the incumbent's facility and facing a higher marginal cost given the per-unit capacity price, but avoiding the fixed cost of building the essential facility.
The welfare analysis gives rise to two key lessons. First, in many cases the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between avoiding fixed costs and softening downstream competition. For instance, facility-based competition is the socially preferred outcome whenever it is observed; and facility sharing is always observed and efficient when fixed costs are high. Second, the relationship between fixed costs and social welfare is nonmonotonic, so competition authorities have to be careful when reviewing antitrust cases.
From society's point of view, facility sharing avoids duplication of facilities and thus generates a cost saving equal to the fixed cost, but this results in higher variable production costs since the entrant's facility would have been more efficient. The intensity of competition is also diminished since the per unit capacity price is higher than the entrant's marginal cost when building its own facility.
These results have interesting policy implications. 4 First, facility-based competition and full vertical integration is pro-competitive and efficient. This means that when a market is liberalized, competition authorities should not oppose facility-based competition and 3 This form of raising rival's costs strategy was first studied formally by Salop and Sheffman (1987) . 4 The policy prescriptions suggested here should be qualified by the fact that we only consider two different entry modes; no collusion is assumed; nonlinear pricing of capacity is not allowed; and the incumbent cannot degrade the quality of access to its facility. December 2006 No.4 vertical integration. Second, under facility sharing, vertical integration by the incumbent is not necessarily associated with restricted access to the incumbent's facility. Third, our results challenge the widely held belief that if the owner of an essential facility charges a downstream competitor a different price than it charges its vertically integrated affiliate, it acquires market power. Our results suggest that, depending on the relative efficiency of the entrant's facility, charging a price above the incumbent's upstream marginal cost of production may be socially efficient. Fourth, after liberalization the access charge is sometimes set below the incumbent's marginal cost, which is socially efficient.
As far as we are aware, this is the first time vertical integration has been analyzed in conjunction with facility sharing, although each of these phenomena has been extensively studied separately. From the standpoint of vertical integration, the paper's closest relation is the study by Gaudet and Van Long (1997) . These authors show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy when the number of upstream and downstream firms is less than five, and that multiple equilibria exist for more than four firms, with full vertical integration being one of the possibilities. Gaudet and Van Long derive their results by assuming
Cournot competition upstream and downstream, together with zero marginal costs and a linear demand function. As in this paper, they also do not impose market foreclosure. Other related papers on market foreclosure deal with vertical integration under different types of competition and various assumptions. These mainly deal with foreclosure under Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods upstream thereby eliminating the efficiency gains arising from avoiding double-marginalization. For instance, the well-know study by Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) In a closely related paper, Chen and Ross (2000) show that facility sharing in a monopolistic market may deter more aggressive entry that would reduce the incumbent's 5 This result is also derived by Chen (2001) Gale (1994) shows that co-tenancy under a use-or-lose provision achieves a constrained Pareto optimum under open entry conditions, in which each party may utilize any unused portion of the other party's capacity by assuming the variable costs attributable to the additional production, but no portion of the fixed costs. In this setting, the equilibrium price converges to the long-run average cost. Neither of these two papers deals with vertical integration and foreclosure; and the latter does not allow for an endogenous entry mode either, i.e. it looks only at capacity choice by firms that form a co-tenancy prior to building capacity, without allowing a firm to enter the market by building capacity outside of co-tenancy.
Lastly, our paper is also related to the literature dealing with excess capacity as a deterrent instrument. Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) , for example, show how excess capacity is used as a deterrent instrument. In such papers, however, the incumbent chooses its capacity, whereas our paper starts from a situation in which the incumbent's capacity is already in place and there is excess capacity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model; then in section III, we derive the equilibrium market structure under full and partial entry, together with the optimal entry mode and the welfare consequences of the equilibrium market structure. Two extensions are briefly discussed in section IV, namely: (i) the existence of capacity constraints under facility sharing; and (ii) a different bargaining assumption in determining the per-unit price of capacity. Concluding remarks are presented in the final section. 6 The facility sharing contract used by Chen and Ross to derive this result is different from ours. Their contract allows the incumbent to set both the unit capacity price and the maximum quantity of capacity that the entrant can buy. They show that the optimal per-unit capacity price is a negative number large enough to induce the entrant to stay out of the market. In order to avoid this problem, they assume a non-negative per-unit capacity price based on the feasibility of implementing that type of contract in the real world. 
III THE ANALYSIS

Preliminaries
The inverse demand function faced by downstream firms is assumed to be of the following form:
where .
Since downstream firms compete à-la-Cournot, firm D i chooses the final-good production level that maximizes its profit, which is given by:
where denotes the number of integrated firms. It is straightforward to verify that
units of the final good and makes a profit o 8 We envisage a situation in which new technologies have become available since the last time the incumbent firm upgraded its facility. 9 The results are robust to Bertrand competition with differentiated goods downstream. 10 Although most results do not depend on this assumption, the simplification allows us to obtain closed-form solutions that greatly facilitate the welfare analysis. 
In this section we assume that each upstream firm owns a facility, so upstream firm i 's marginal cost of production is , for , where is the level of input production when no firm is vertically integrated. Thus, upstream firm chooses
Given quantity competition, it can readily be verified that, in equilibrium, upstream firm produces
, where stands for full entry. Hence, upstream firm 's profit is given by: where and , and downstream firm 's profit is given by:
Next consider a full integration situation. As there will be no demand for inputs from independent upstream firms, this market configuration corresponds to a standard Cournot duopoly in which the vertically integrated firm 's marginal cost is . In this case the equilibrium quantities are given by:
, and firm 's profit is:
where 2 stands for two vertically integrated firms.
Lastly, we consider the case in which only firms and merge to form the vertically integrated firm . In this situation, the integrated and the nonintegrated downstream firms simultaneously determine the quantities of the final output to be produced. This stage is preceded by the upstream production stage, during which upstream firms compete on the basis of quantities, taking account of the derived demand resulting from final-good production decisions at the next stage. The decision variable of the nonintegrated upstream firm is the quantity of the upstream good to produce, . At this stage, the decision that matters for the integrated firm is its net sales to the nonintegrated sector, hereinafter denoted by . We allow the quantity of the input traded between the non-integrated firm and the integrated one to be determined endogenously with no a priori restrictions on the direction of this trade. In other words, the integrated firm may, if it so chooses, sell inputs to the nonintegrated downstream firm or buy inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firm, so may either be positive or negative. The total profit of the integrated firm is ( )
, the profit of the nonintegrated upstream firm is
, and that of the nonintegrated downstream firm is
The following lemma is formally proven in the appendix, as are all subsequent lemmas and propositions. 
This lemma shows that the integrated upstream firm buys inputs from the unintegrated counterpart at the market-clearing price ( )
, which exceeds its own upstream marginal cost of production. This is done for a strategic reason, namely to raise the input price paid by the non-integrated downstream firm, which, in turn, reduces the intensity of competition in the downstream market. This is known as the raising rivals' costs strategy (Salop and Sheffman, 1987) , and it has been studied for the case of symmetric Cournot oligopolies by Gaudet and Van Long (1997) . relative to the cost of buying inputs at a higher price.
Use of the raising rivals' cost strategy by the integrated firm is costly for the nonintegrated firm, which has to pay more for the input than when the integrated firm does not pursue that strategy. This increases the nonintegrated firm's incentive to vertically integrate since this would make the raising rivals' cost strategy unprofitable for the competitor. Thus, when the quantity of the input traded between the nonintegrated firm and the integrated firm is determined endogenously, there are two reasons for vertical integration: the standard one, which is to avoid double marginalization, and a new one, which is to avoid the consequences of competing with an integrated firm that takes steps to raise the downstream rival's marginal cost. Profit comparisons across different market configurations provide the following result.
Proposition 2 Under facility-based competition, in equilibrium there is full vertical integration for all .
[ ]
This proposition establishes that the only equilibrium market configuration under facility-based competition is for both upstream firms to vertically integrate. This occurs even though the firms are better-off if no one integrates; i.e.
( ) ( ) ( )
. The firms thus face a prisoner's dilemma situation for while vertical integration is the unique equilibrium, each firm would be better-off if no one integrated. The reason is that by reducing the cost of the input into the downstream production process, vertical integration will increase competition in the downstream market, thus mitigating the gains from eliminating double marginalization. Gaudet and Van Long (1997) show that when the marginal cost is zero for all upstream firms and there are more than four firms upstream and downstream, this result no longer holds. The reason is that when there are several firms in the downstream market the gain from reducing competition in that market cannot offset the increased marginal cost of production 
Partial Entry: Facility Sharing
In this section we derive the equilibrium market structure when the entrant shares the incumbent's facility. In order to do so, the terms of the sharing contract have to be made explicit, mainly we assume that the incumbent sells as many units of capacity as the entrant wants at a given per-unit price of capacity or access charge y r . For the time being this price is treated as a parameter and in the next section the optimal r for the incumbent firm will be obtained. In order to guarantee non-negative quantities under each possible market configuration or a non-negative demand for capacity, we assume that r is never above the monopoly price 2 1 m a+ . In the next section we derive the optimal access charge r and show that in equilibrium this never exceeds the monopoly price.
Once the two firms have agreed to share the incumbent's facility under the terms of the contract, each upstream firm has to decide how many units of input to produce, and then ( )
As the first-order conditions are the same as under facility-based competition, the following can be shown to be true.
Lemma 3 If only the entrant integrates, then: (i) the input market clearing price is:
( ) ( There are two points to notice here. First, the amount of input that the integrated firm buys from the nonintegrated upstream firm rises with the per-unit price of capacity
r . This is because the cost to the entrant of using the raising rivals' cost strategy decreases as its marginal cost of production rises, because the opportunity cost of buying input in the market is higher. Thus, when negotiating the per-unit capacity price, the incumbent needs to bear in mind that a higher access charge makes the entrant behave more aggressively in terms of buying inputs from the incumbent to mitigate downstream competition. Secondly, the amount of input produced by the integrated firm is larger, and that produced by the nonintegrated firm is smaller, relative to output levels when both firms integrate. The reason is that the unintegrated firm does not avoid double marginalization and does not counter the cost of the raising rivals' cost strategy used by the integrated firm. Thus, for a given capacity price, the incumbent sells more units when only the entrant integrates vertically.
It readily follows from lemma 3 that the incumbent's profit is given by: , which is lower than the monopoly price. The reason is that a higher price per-unit of capacity induces the entrant to buy fewer units of capacity and more units of input, but the combined purchases decrease.
Lastly we consider the case in which the entrant remains as an independent firm while the incumbent integrates vertically. In this case the incumbent chooses to maximize The two remarks made for lemma 3 also apply here.
It follows from lemma 4 that the entrant's profit is given by:
( ) since there is an extra benefit from raising the access charge, namely a decrease in net sales to the unintegrated sector.
As under facility-based competition, vertical integration avoids double marginalization and counters the incentives of the integrated firm to soften downstream competition by purchasing inputs from the unintegrated sector. However, under facility sharing, on the one hand the entrant is more aggressive in terms of buying inputs from the incumbent when this is not integrated and hence the incumbent has more incentive to counter this effect by integrating vertically. On the other hand, by integrating vertically, the incumbent sells fewer units of capacity to the entrant than when the latter is integrated and the incumbent is not. Thus, the incumbent firm has a countervailing incentive to integrate .
Surprisingly, in equilibrium, the entry mode does not alter the equilibrium market structure; vertical integration remains the unique market equilibrium structure when facility-based competition occurs and the access charge is set below the monopoly price.
Thus, facility sharing does not modify the prisoner's dilemma-type problem faced by firms when deciding whether or not to integrate.
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The Optimal Entry Mode
In this section we derive the optimal entry mode. By sharing its facility with the entrant, the incumbent becomes the sole provider of capacity and attempts to exploit its monopoly power. This is limited, however, by the fact that the entrant can build its own facility if the access charge is set too high. How much the incumbent charges for access depends mainly on the following: the fixed cost of building a new facility and the efficiency thereof, the type of access contracts that are allowed, and the incumbent's bargaining power.
For simplicity, as mentioned in the previous section, we consider a facility-sharing contract in which the incumbent sells however many units of capacity the entrant desires at a fixed per-unit capacity price, r . Following Chen and Ross (2001), we assume that the per-unit capacity price is determined by bargaining between the entrant and the incumbent, where the latter makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the entrant. 13 Furthermore, following normal practice in the vertical integration literature, we assume that upstream firms make 12 This result is partly driven by the assumption that there is no capacity constraint under facility sharing. This will be discussed in more detail in Section. 13 The consequences of this assumption are discussed in Section. 4 take-it-or-leave-it offers to downstream firms. This implies that the upstream firm obtains the total profit from integration minus the downstream profit when no integration occurs, both conditional on the rival's strategy.
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Under these assumptions, the entrant prefers to share the incumbent's facility than build a new one, if and only if the rent from vertical integration and facility sharing is at least as large as the rent from vertical integration and facility-based competition. In other words, for a given r :
This constraint is referred to as the entrant's facility-sharing constraint.
Note that for any given r the entrant's willingness to pay for each unit of capacity rises with the fixed cost, since by purchasing access to the incumbent's facility the entrant's cost savings increase. When the fixed cost is zero, the most that the entrant is willing to pay for each unit of capacity is the upstream marginal cost of production of a new facility, .
Moreover, the entrant's rent from integrating vertically when the incumbent is integrated decreases with 2 m r since this implies a larger marginal cost of production for the entrant.
The incumbent chooses a capacity price that solves the following problem: where K is the largest fixed cost at which the entrant makes non-negative profits under facility-based competition and full integration.
14 Thus, the optimal per-unit capacity price, denoted by , is given by: when the fixed cost is such that the entrant earns zero rents from building a new facility K . Thirdly, the per-unit capacity price rises with the fixed cost since the entrant's cost saving from sharing the incumbent's facility increases. Fourthly, the optimal per-unit capacity price is smaller than when the fixed cost is sufficiently low, which in turn implies that the incumbent sells capacity units at a price below its marginal cost of production when facility sharing occurs. And fifthly, the access charge is always set at a level below the monopoly price, because the profit made by the downstream firm when it stays unintegrated, and the entrant is vertically integrated, increases with the access charge The reason for this is as follows: when K K > , entry is a noncredible threat since the entrant's profit from facility-based competition is negative. Thus, the incumbent ignores that threat for example by offering to share its facility at a capacity price that is higher than the monopoly price. When This means the incumbent is willing to sell capacity at a unit price below marginal cost to deter the entrant from building its own facility, and thereby obtains the benefits of curbing competition. However, when the fixed cost is sufficiently small, , deterring the entrant from building its own facility by charging for access below marginal cost is too costly, since the looses arising from selling capacity at less than marginal cost cannot be 1 m *
≤ K K
16 This is similar to what Chen and Ross (2000) call the collusion effect. There are two main differences between our paper and theirs. Firstly, Chen and Ross set the price per-unit of capacity to zero, so collusion is achieved by restricting the amount of capacity sold to a level below what the entrant would buy if it were to build a facility. Secondly, they assume that the incumbent and the entrant have the same upstream marginal cost of production. December 2006 No.4 compensated by the gains from curbing competition. Facility-based competition thus occurs.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
In short, the incumbent faces a basic trade-off between curbing competition by dissuading the entrant from building its own facility, versus selling units of capacity at a per-unit price that is below the marginal cost. The basic trade-off faced by the entrant, in contrast, is between building its own facility and having a low marginal cost, versus sharing the incumbent's facility and having a higher marginal cost ( )
, but a fixed cost saving equal to K .
Welfare Analysis
In this section we analyze the efficiency of facility-based competition compared to facility sharing. First, notice that facility sharing is always more efficient socially than no entry because the former expands output beyond the pre-liberalization level without incurring any new fixed cost. So, a priori and compared to no entry, the competition authority might be expected to support agreements to share the incumbent's facility, since these would benefit consumers, the entrant and society at large. This logic is flawed, however because facility sharing may take the place of more aggressive entry that would involve building a new and more efficient facility.
Facility sharing in comparison to facility-based competition affects total welfare through two channels. Firstly, it avoids duplication of facilities, and hence generates a cost saving of ; but this results in a higher variable cost of production since .
Secondly, it lowers the intensity of competition since the unit price of capacity is higher than the entrant's marginal cost when it builds its own facility. The first effect can either increase or decrease welfare while the second decreases it. To determine the net effect, we
is total welfare when the entrant builds its own facility before considering the fixed costs directly, and ( 
Before finding the condition under which
holds, at least three comments that are worth making. First, the total output produced under facility-based competition is larger than that under facility sharing, because for all the per-unit price of capacity is set to a level higher than the entrant's facility marginal cost . This means that consumers' welfare is lower under facility sharing. Second, for ,
decreases with the fixed cost since the capacity price is independent of it. Thus, there is a fixed cost cutoff at which facility sharing starts to yields a higher welfare. In what follows, this cutoff is denoted by and is formally defined as the smallest fixed cost such that when the optimal per-unit capacity price is set at * * . The more efficient the entrant's facility relative to the existing one, the more likely it is that facility-based competition will generate greater total welfare than facility sharing. The reason is that the social cost of curbing competition through facility sharing is higher the more efficient is the entrant's facility.
Thus, the following proposition holds, as shown in the appendix. 17 The existence of * * K is guaranteed by the fact that the optimal access charge is below the monopoly price. This implies that the fixed cost saving obtained by sharing the incumbent's facility more than compensates for the social cost of softening competition. 
∈ with such that facility-based competition is more efficient than facility sharing for all [ ]
This proposition leads to several interesting results. When the relative efficiency of the entrant's facility is sufficiently large, i.e.
( )
, facility-based competition is efficient for all . The reason is that the social cost of curbing competition is high, so unless the fixed cost saving from sharing the incumbent's facility is also large, facility-based competition is socially efficient. This result, coupled with the fact that facility-based competition is observed only when * *
, implies that it is always efficient when it occurs. Moreover, because , there is a range for the fixed cost given by * * *
such that facility-based competition is efficient but not observed. Hence, the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between saving on fixed costs and curbing competition when the fixed costs are either relatively small * ≤ K K or relatively large . * *
> K K
When the relative efficiency of the entrant's facility is small enough, i.e. , facility-based competition is efficient for all
, whereas facility sharing is efficient otherwise. Because the social cost of curbing competition is now small, the fixed cost saving obtained by sharing the incumbent's facility does not need to be large to make facility sharing socially efficient. Once again, when observed, facility-based competition is efficient.
Finally, when the relative efficiency of the entrant's facility is neither sufficiently small nor sufficiently large, i.e.
, the relationship between total welfare and fixed costs is non-monotonic. To gain a better understanding of this, it is useful to consider why there is a and , both lower than , such that total welfare is the same under either entry mode at these cutoffs. When the cost of building a December 2006 No.4 new facility is zero, the optimal price per-unit of capacity ( ) K r is and hence total welfare should be the same under either entry mode. Yet, because the incumbent's facility is less efficient than the entrant's, sharing the incumbent's facility causes total industry output to be produced less efficiently, and thus with a higher variable cost of production.
It follows from this that when the fixed cost is small, facility-based competition is the socially preferred outcome. When the cost of building a new facility is , then K
. Thus, the social cost of curbing competition exceeds the saving on fixed costs. These two results jointly explain why facility sharing is welfare-enhancing for while
. Lastly, we note that for , is independent of so the social cost of curbing competition remains the same while the fixed cost saving keeps increasing with . Thus, for , facility sharing is the socially preferred outcome. In this case, it is also true that facility-based competition, when observed, is the socially preferred outcome.
There are two key lessons to be derived from the welfare analysis. Firstly, in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between fixed cost savings and softening downstream competition. In fact, whenever facility-based competition is observed it is socially efficient. Secondly, as the relationship between fixed costs and social welfare is non-monotonic, the competition authorities need to be careful when analyzing antitrust cases. 
IV ROBUSTNESS
In order to reduce the complexity of the issue studied here, we have made several simplifying assumptions, and a thorough analysis of robustness would require a paper in its own right. We will therefore focus on the following two issues: (i) a capacity limit is imposed on the incumbent's facility; and (ii) the entrant is assumed to have all the bargaining power.
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Capacity Constraints
The results derived in propositions and were obtained under the assumption that each facility has unlimited capacity, which in some circumstances is unrealistic. In this section we explore how the results change when the incumbent cannot satisfy the entrant's demand for capacity under each possible market structure, but when each upstream firm has its own facility there are no capacity constraints.
Under facility-based competition, the unique market equilibrium is still full vertical integration since there are no capacity restrictions; but under facility sharing the capacity constraint does prevents the incumbent from reaping the benefits of vertical integration since that means expanding output beyond available capacity. Furthermore, the opportunity cost to the incumbent of using a unit of capacity at a of cost is now the price that the integrated sector is willing to pay for that unit, which may be greater than . In fact, it can be shown that, vertical integration by the entrant and nonvertical integration by the incumbent is the 1 m 1 m unique equilibrium market structure under facility sharing.
As was the case under unlimited capacity, the per-unit capacity price depends on the level of fixed cost, so, when the latter is sufficiently large, sharing the incumbent's facility is chosen rather than facility-based competition. Thus the main differences with the nocapacity-constraint case are that the incumbent will never choose to integrate with a downstream firm upon entry and that the fixed-cost threshold for facility-based competition is positive irrespective of the value of . 
Bargaining Power
It is fairly obvious that our results partly depend on the assumption that the incumbent has all the bargaining power. We now analyze the opposite case in which the entrant has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the incumbent to buy as many units of capacity as it wants at per-unit price of capacity r .
Because the entrant has all the bargaining power, on entry it will make an offer to the incumbent to buy as many units of capacity as it wants at a price that leaves the incumbent indifferent between accepting and rejecting the proposal to share its facility with the entrant. In other words, the entrant will offer the lowest possible access charge such that:
It is easy to verify that this price, denoted by * r , is given by: sharing the incumbent's facility, and obtain the input for the same price as when it builds its own facility. Thus, facility sharing is the unique equilibrium and is efficient. When , the incumbent is willing to share its facility at a per-unit capacity price below marginal cost because it can thus curb competition in a way that outweighs the loss sustained by selling units of capacity for less than marginal cost . This means that there is a level of fixed cost above which facility sharing is the only equilibrium, while facilitybased competition is the unique equilibrium otherwise. competition is socially efficient when the fixed cost is below a certain threshold, while facility sharing is the socially preferred entry mode otherwise. In this case it is also true that facility-based competition, when observed, is socially efficient.
This suggests that when neither the entrant nor the incumbent has all the bargaining power the result would be qualitatively the same as when the incumbent has all the bargaining power. Nonetheless, the optimal per-unit price of capacity would be smaller, which in turn implies that facility sharing plus full integration would occur more often and social welfare would be larger. V CONCLUSIONS This paper has studied the market equilibrium and the welfare implications of liberalization in an industry initially characterized by an upstream monopoly owning an essential facility.
We have shown that facility-based competition and full vertical integration occurs when the fixed cost is below a positive fixed-cost threshold, with facility sharing and full vertical integration occurring otherwise. Two key lessons were obtained in terms of the welfare implications of liberalization,. First, in many cases, the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between saving fixed costs and softening downstream competition. For instance, whenever facility-based competition is observed it is the socially preferred outcome; and when fixed costs are high, facility sharing is always observed and efficient. Second, the relationship between fixed costs and social welfare is non-monotonic, so the competition authorities must be careful when analyzing antitrust cases.
These results provide a rationale for the liberalization of industries with natural monopoly characteristics as a complementary measure, if not as an alternative to direct regulation. In fact, unregulated privatization is a relevant policy design under facility-based competition. In practice, however, identifying the industries to which this can be applied requires a case by case analysis that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Liberalization may also be useful as an antitrust remedy, especially when fixed costs are low and the relative efficiency of a new facility is large. Some caveats are in order, however. First, we have assumed that the incumbent cannot deter entry, which is not necessarily true particularly in network industries. Second, we did not consider the issue of degrading the quality of access to the incumbent's facility, a strategy that may undermine the benefits of liberalization and usually results in some type of regulation in the industry. 21 And, third, we have ignored other anticompetitive practices that could be facilitated by vertical integration, such as collusion. It readily follows from these equilibrium conditions that the optimal quantities are: Proof of Proposition 2.
Firstly, consider the best response of firms and to nonintegration by firms and Next suppose that and These two jointly imply that vertical integration is a dominant strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Applying the envelope theorem, the first-order conditions are given by: 
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Firstly consider the best response of firms and to nonintegration by firms and 
Proof of Proposition 6:
The incumbent faces the following optimization problem:
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ting the corresponding profit levels and quantities, it can be verified that
